The Manual of Ideas Summary

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The Manual of Ideas by John Mihaljevic
The Proven Framework for Finding the Best Value Investments

My Thoughts

The concepts in The Manual of Ideas are primarily for sophisticated and enterprising investors. Each chapter contains a different investing idea, they can be read in any order and don’t require reading the entire book. I recommend skipping around and reading the chapters that appeal to you.

If you want a shorter overview, Digging for Value has a nice succinct summary here.

My Favorite Quotes

  • Investors who view themselves as owners, rather than traders, look to the business rather than the market for return on investment.
  • Avoiding stupidity is easier than seeking brilliance
  • Judge company management by what they do, not by what they say.
  • You can achieve a lot of success in business by making a strategic choice to say no to the customer. – Guy Spier
  • Many investors seem to lack confidence in their own reasoning unless others agree with them.
  • The single biggest error in investing is usually overconfidence. Investing is hard, with elements of skill, hard work, and luck involved. An investor who attributes every success to skill is susceptible to overreaching.
  • Fear is raw and debilitating, fear compels many investors to avoid specific investments at any price.

Key Questions

  • Are the CEO’s communications with shareholders open and honest?
  • How do you allocate capital?
  • If I give you a blank check tomorrow for $1B, $10M, or $1M, what will you do with that? How would you appraise what to do with that?
  • What is the source of potential inefficiency?
  • What is the margin of safety?
  • What is the path to value creation?

Chapter 1: A Highly Personal Endeavor – What Do You Want to Own?

When a valuation appears to get out of hand, it helps to ask what else an equivalent sum of money could buy.

Investors who view themselves as owners, rather than traders, look to the business rather than the market for return on investment.

Objectives of stock selection framework:

  1. Flexible enough to allow for analysis of any stock, regardless of company size or industry. Yet…
  2. Concrete enough to be useful in making informed investment decisions.

We should have a model that boils all companies down to the same dimension: equity value. By comparing that value with market value, we can make informed investment decisions.

Stock Selection Framework

  • Idea Generation
  • Asset Value Analysis I
    • Upper Boundary: Replacement Value
    • Is XYZ quoted more highly than it would cost to create the substantially same company?
    • Is (enterprise value) / (replacement cost) > 1?
  • Asset Value Analysis II
    • Lower Boundary: Liquidation Value
    • Is XYZ quoted for less than its liquidation value?
    • IS (book equity – liquidation impairments – market capitalization) > $0?
  • Earnings Power Analysis I
    • Earnings Yield
    • Does normalized EBIT provide an attractive yield on current enterprise value?
    • Is (normalized EBIT) / (enterprise value) > required return)?
  • Earnings Power Analysis II
    • Return on capital
    • Does normalized EBIT provide an attractive return on capital employed?
    • Is (normalized EBIT) / (capital employed) > (required return)?
    • Can capital be reinvested at the normalized return on capital?
    • Are above-average returns on capital sustainable?

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 1

  1. In investing it is hard enough to succeed as an original, as a copycat it is virtually impossible.
  2. A share of stock represents a share in the ownership of a business.
  3. Investors tend to add capital to investment funds after a period of good performance and withdraw capital after a period of bad performance, causing their actual results to lag behind the fund’s reported results.
  4. Those considering an investment in a hedge fund must first convince themselves that their perspective manager can beat Warren Buffett [otherwise invest in Berkshire at a good price].
  5. The world’s richest investor (Warren Buffett) is a capital allocator rather than a trend follower or day trader.
  6. The “small fish mindset” does not benefit us as investors. We benefit from casting ourselves in the role of the world’s chief capital allocator.
  7. Any impression that someone else will take care of company losses is an illusion. The shareholder always pays for the losses in one way or another.
  8. Losses have a perverse impact on long-term capital appreciation.
  9. Nature seems to have imposed a size limit on mammals and companies. Mohnish Pabrai advises against investing in companies that become too large.
  10. Thinking like a capital allocator goes hand in hand with thinking like an owner. Investors who view themselves as owners, rather than traders, look to the business rather than the market for return on investment.

Chapter 2: Deep Value – Ben Graham Style Bargains

This section focuses on “net-nets.” Companies trading at a price below the value of its current assets after deducting all liabilities. Look for stocks with a price/book value below 1.

Beware of portfolio concentration in the land of “cigar butts.”

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 2

  1. Graham-style investing unabashedly starts with the price of the stock. Unless the price looks like a bargain based on tangible metrics, Graham-style investors have no interest.
  2. It has been consistently found that equities with high book to market ratios outperform those with low ratios.
  3. A “holy grail” might be uncovering equities that provide both asset protection on the balance sheet, and own businesses with higher returns on capital. This combination is virtually impossible to find unless the company has experienced a steep near-term profit decline.
  4. By prioritizing the return of cash to shareholders, low-return businesses can assist investors in earning a strong investment return. Assuming the equity purchase price was favorable.
  5. Investors may overestimate liquidation values, as the reality of a dying business tends to hide some nasty surprises.
  6. Acceptance of discomfort can be rewarding in investing, as fearful equities frequently trade at an exceptionally low valuation.
  7. When we invest in an asset-rich but low-return business, time may be working against us. As long as management can hold onto the assets and keep reinvesting at low-returns, shareholders may earn unimpressive returns despite a bargain purchase price.
  8. Businesses trading at deep value prices are among those most likely to be creatively destroyed. It seems unwise to allocate a large portion of investable capital to any single deep value opportunity, even if it promises a large return.
  9. Several considerations may augment the likelihood that a Graham-style screen yields a list of market-beating candidates. Share repurchases, insider buying, and cash generated through working capital shrinkage may be used as screening factors.
  10. When we value a company based solely on readily ascertainable balance sheet values, we run the risk that those values erode over time, negatively impacting future equity value.

Chapter 3: Sum-of-the-Parts Value – Investing in Companies with Excess or Hidden Assets

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 3

  1. Many companies can be appraised most accurately by analyzing each of their distinct businesses or assets separately and adding up those components of value to arrive at an estimate of overall enterprise or equity value.
  2. A reason for the market’s occasional mispricing of companies with multiple sources of value may be investors’ unwillingness to value assets that differ materially from a company’s core assets.
  3. Companies with distinct components of value often enjoy greater strategic flexibility, as they may divest a fairly valued asset to improve the balance sheet, repurchase undervalued shares, or reinvest capital in a high-return business.
  4. Sometimes investors in their zeal to create a “sum-of-the-parts” opportunity slice a company into too many parts, creating an attractive investment thesis in theory but not in reality.
  5. We normally do not require a catalyst, but we find that situations with multiple sources of value are more prone to becoming value traps in the absence of strategic action.
  6. It matters tremendously whether the offer is buy-one-get-one-free or buy-ten-get-one-free, as shoppers we recognize the former as a more compelling offer, as investors we often overlook this important distinction.
  7. Sum-of-the-parts opportunities come in a few different flavors, each of which demands a slightly different approach to screening.
  8. The value of a sum-of-the-parts analysis grows when the various business segments demand a distinct approach to valuation.
  9. Some hidden-asset stories are so compelling that they attract quite a few smart investors, potentially eliminating both the valuation discount and the hidden nature of the assets.
  10. Whenever hidden assets motivate us to consider investing in a security, the question of how those assets will cease to be hidden becomes important.

Chapter 4: Greenblatt’s Magic Search for Good and Cheap Stocks

This chapter discusses an investing concept from The Little Book That Beats the Market by Joel Greenblatt. The idea is to look for above-average businesses (with a high return on capital) at below-average prices (trading at low P/E ratios), Greenblatt calls this the “Magic Formula” and has a free website dedicated to screening stocks at

Joel Greenblatt is the founder of Gotham Funds.

Other reasons to eliminate companies from the magic formula list of potential investments:

  • Pro forma adjustments
  • Capital reinvestment: avoid companies with no opportunity for high-return reinvestment of capital (these are typically companies in industries in long-term decline)
  • Threats to a key revenue source
  • Cyclicality
  • Fads or trends
  • Insider selling: avoid companies with heavy recent insider selling
  • Alignment of interests: avoid companies with CEO conflicts of interest
  • Value proposition: avoid companies that offer a questionable value proposition to their customers
  • M&A rollups

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 4

  1. The advice to buy good companies only when they are cheap seems almost glib at first glance. However, this advice is invaluable to anyone seeking market-beating returns.
  2. According to the magic formula, the higher the return on capital employed the better the business. Capital employed is calculated as net working capital plus net fixed assets.
  3. Greenblatt’s use of operating income to enterprise value as a way of determining cheapness is congruent with his use of operating income to capital employed as a way of determining quality. This strips the effects of leverage and taxes from both calculations.
  4. In theory, the historical outperformance of Greenblatt’s methodology should prompt investors to flock to it in droves, thereby eliminating its perspective attractiveness. In practice, several considerations suggest that the magic formula is likely to keep outperforming over time.
  5. Just as long/short portfolios face unattractive risk-adjusted returns if they are built entirely on a magic formula ranking, long-only portfolios could suffer debilitating volatility if they consist of a very small number of highly ranked equities.
  6. Mr. Market makes two mistakes with some consistency. (1) it overvalues high-return businesses whose returns on capital derive from explosive but ultimately transitory trends or fads. (2) it may undervalue un-hyped quality businesses with sustainable high-return reinvestment opportunities.
  7. One of the key adjustments we like to make to the original magic formula is to use forward-looking earnings data in the calculation.
  8. If we can run our magic formula screen on an equities database that includes both US and non-US listed companies, the increased number of companies to choose from should enhance prospective performance.
  9. Instead of simply adding up the twin magic formula rankings in a linear fashion, it might make sense to introduce an arbitrary hurdle above which we can consider all companies tied from the perspective of returns on capital.
  10. High returns on exiting capital (the capital already employed in the business) are almost meaningless without an ability to invest new capital at above-average returns.

Chapter 5: Jockey Stocks – Making Money Alongside Great Managers

For Buffett, the foremost goal is to invest not in great management, but in great businesses.

Mr. Market has a tendency to deify certain executives, sending their company stock prices into the stratosphere.

Our goal should be to identify CEO’s who are underappreciated. Such executives tend to be soft-spoken and non-promotional. When considering management we find humility and conservatism to be important qualities. The right breed of CEO generally feels that the results should speak for themselves, and those results should be stated as conservatively as possible.

Skeptics of the jockey method may want to study the examples of Berkshire Hathaway (Warren Buffett), Fairfax Financial (Prem Watsa), and Leucadia National (Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg) [Leucadia is now Jefferies Financial Group].

Examples of good communication from a CEO to shareholders are the annual letters of Warren Buffett and from Jamie Dimon the CEO of JP Morgan.

Key proxies for evaluating management performance:

  • Return on capital employed
  • Growth of capital employed (per share)
  • The margin profile
  • Asset turnover
  • Capital expenditure trends

Suggested questions for investors to ask a CEO:

  • How do you allocate capital?
  • If I give you a blank check tomorrow for $1B, $10M, or $1M, what will you do with that? How would you appraise what to do with that?

Judge company management by what they do, not by what they say.

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 5

  1. Chief executives can distinguish themselves in two major ways. (1) business value creation and (2) smart capital allocation.
  2. We need to distinguish between business performance and the stock price.
  3. Charlie Munger’s advice to invert serves us well when analyzing managers, not in identifying the greatest jockeys but in eliminating the bad actors. [from Charlie Munger: avoiding stupidity is easier than seeking brilliance.] A good acid test is compensation.
  4. Several factors reflect directly upon a CEO’s attitude toward the owners of the business. Are the CEO’s communications with shareholders open and honest? What is the composition of the board of directors? What does financial leverage tell us about the management?
  5. Determinations like “shareholder friendliness,” alignment of interests, and the ability to run a business, not only involve many variables but also an element of judgment.
  6. In the context of screening for companies with a close alignment of interest between management and shareholders, we rely on two readily available proxies (1) stock ownership and (2) insider buying activity.
  7. Between the extremes of excellent and poor capital allocators is a world of mediocrity in which managements often view reinvestment of capital as the default option, giving little consideration to the alternatives.
  8. Building a list of great capital allocators represents a continuous process of discovery and curation. Corporate executives come and go.
  9. Subjective assessment of management in a one-on-one meeting likely adds value to the investment process. Assuming the investor is aware of the biases involved, and judges correctly, that awareness will render any biases inconsequential.
  10. In addition to selecting a proper focus for a management meeting, investors may want to prioritize meetings likely to produce incremental differentiated insights.

Chapter 6: Follow the Leaders – Finding Opportunity in Super-investor Portfolios

You can achieve a lot of success in business by making a strategic choice to say no to the customer. – Guy Spier

Giving credit to others never diminishes ourselves, in fact, it usually enhances our standing. -Guy Spier

Investors interested in passively tracking a super investor’s portfolio may be better off simply allocating some capital to that investor’s vehicle.

Context is important, try to understand the why of an investment, not just the what.

Screening for companies owned by super-investors.
We are much more likely to understand and agree with the rationale of a super-investor who has an approach we understand and embrace.

Rather than following a single investor, you may want to develop a tracking portfolio of several super-investors. Consider following some of these investors:

You can track the trades of super-investors by searching their CIK number at
This chapter lists dozens of investors of various styles and their CIK numbers. If this is of interest to you I suggest taking a closer look at this chapter.
You can also look at the holdings of investors at gurufocus, this link shows the holdings of Warren Buffett for example.

Factors for estimating a super investor’s likely conviction level of a specific investment:

  • Position size within the portfolio
  • Type of change in the number of shares owned
  • New increased or reduced position
  • Holding as a percentage of the subject company’s equity: less than 5%, more than 5%, or more than 10%. These numbers are significant because they represent SEC filing thresholds.
  • Stock price change since the filing date
  • Time-lapse since filing date
  • Relevant investor commentary (comments in shareholder letters, etc)

The ability to reinvest capital at high returns inversely correlates with the size of a business.

Letters to investors represent a great source of learning about fund managers’ approach to investing. Many investment managers write thoughtful idea-rich letters.

Fund managers letters that tend to be available to those that seek them out online include:

  • Warren Buffett
  • Bill Ackman
  • Bruce Berkowitz
  • David Einhorn
  • Dan Loeb
  • Guy Spier

Vintage Value Investing has a good list of regularly published letters from investors.

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 6

  1. Do your own work and don’t trust the tips of others. However, following the moves of super-investors can be profitable if done correctly.
  2. The best investors not only share the distinction of having superior investment returns, but also exhibit a number of other traits: clear thinking, lucid communication, a visible passion for the process of investing, and a surprisingly humble attitude towards success.
  3. Most super-investors view themselves as employers of management, and they are generally not shy about voicing their views on how existing equity value can be unlocked, or new value created.
  4. Even if we accept that super-investors are likely to outperform the market, it is not entirely clear that copying super-investors also leads to outperformance.
  5. One of the dangers of tracking super-investors is our propensity to elevate them to hero status. Super-investors are neither heroes or infallible.
  6. The problem is not only that all investors make mistakes, but also that our ability to stick with an investment is diminished if we have not done the research to give ourselves a certain level of conviction in an idea.
  7. One scenario that plays out quite often among equity investors is their desire to invest in a macro theme or political outcome. To do so, the investor may purchase a number of stocks that express the high-level thesis. It would be a mistake for an observer to view such stock purchases as endorsements of the underlying equity value of the stocks involved.
  8. The first step in setting up a super-investor tracking system is deciding which investors to track. Factors in this decision include the concentration in an investor’s portfolio, average portfolio turnover, propensity to employ short-selling, and the congruence between one’s own investment approach and that of the investor.
  9. Turnover is an important consideration because as outside observers, we receive only delayed notice of other investor’s buy and sell activity.
  10. Context is paramount when assessing the purchase and sale activity of super-investors.

Chapter 7: Small Stocks, Big Returns – The Opportunity in Underfollowed Small and Micro Caps

We consider a large percentage of small companies un-investable. You should first apply an “invest-ability” screen prior to analyzing small companies.

Examples of “invest-ability” criteria can include:

  • Has a market value of more than $50 million
  • Company has more than 10 employees
  • Insider ownership of 1% or more
  • Trailing revenue of at least $10 million
  • An average daily trading volume of at least $500,000

Many investors seem to lack confidence in their own reasoning unless others agree with them.

Questions to ask about companies that pass the screening process:

  • Did a company pass the right screen for the wrong reason?
  • Do the financial statements raise any red flags?
  • Who has been buying and selling the shares?
  • What is management’s attitude toward outside shareholders?
  • Where are the shares relative to their historical range?

Spend plenty of time reading the company proxy statement for details of executive compensation.

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 7

  1. Several key developments have created opportunities for small stock investors, including an increase in the size of institutional portfolios, an escalation of compensation expectations, exclusion of small stocks from major market indices, and scant research coverage by sell-side firms.
  2. Major shareholders may have more influence on small company CEOs than they’d o on their large-company counterparts.
  3. We find that small stocks outperform large stocks by a statistically significant margin over time.
  4. Even if small caps as a group stop outperforming large caps, the differential between the top and bottom performers should continue to be greater in the case of smaller stocks.
  5. While under-followed situations generally offer fertile ground for research-driven investors, it is not always necessary that many people analyze an investment for pricing inefficiency to be eliminated.
  6. In the small-cap arena, moving beyond quantitative screens is valuable because few professional investors are willing to start at “A” and work through “Z” in their appraisal of the qualitative value drivers of small companies.
  7. Small company executives are also generally more forthcoming than are corporate executives, whose ability to communicate spontaneously has been layered into oblivion.
  8. One well-known drawback of small stock investing is the, at times, severely restrained trading liquidity of smaller companies.
  9. Many of the best small stock opportunities elude discovery by quantitative screens. The reasons include rapid change in company fundamentals, the disproportionate impact of management quality on value, and the tendency of small companies to lump non-recurring items into financial reports.
  10. We may be able to uncover hidden inflection points by scouring the small-cap landscape for companies with two or more businesses, one of which is typically a large declining legacy business. If the other business is a profitable growth business, we may have found a compelling opportunity.

Chapter 8: Special Situations – Uncovering Opportunity in Event-Driven Investments

Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication. – Leonardo da Vinci

Potential Sources of Opportunity in the Stock Market:

  • End-of-year tax selling
  • Deletion from an index (index funds must sell regardless of investment merit)
  • Dividend cancellation (income funds likely to sell)
  • Distressed seller
  • Spin-off
  • Rights offering
  • Growth disappointment
  • High fear factor
  • High greed factor
  • High judgment factor
  • Valuable intangibles
  • 1x book, low EPS, no debt

Passive investment in special situations (event-driven investments) carries significantly greater risk than does passive investment in equities overall.

To foster deliberate practice over time, we may want to catalog our investment experiences, including decisions to forego specific investments. By recording the reasons for each decision, we form a basis for reevaluation in the future.

Keeping a diary of your investment ideas is a powerful aid, as you can see what you were thinking in real-time, and evaluate your process from a distance in time.

Event-driven investments are anything buy “buy and hold” propositions. If successful, special situations will come to an end, leaving us with a new pile of cash to invest. This requires an ongoing investment effort.

Consumption of regular sources of news and media is important. There are obvious ones such as The Wall Street Journal, The Financial Times, and The Economist. Also, consider these online blogs:

Asking the right questions about special situations:

  • What is the source of potential inefficiency?
  • What is the margin of safety?
  • What is the path to value creation?

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 8

  1. Special situations encompass equities whose near to medium term stock price performance is largely independent of the performance of equity markets.
  2. The flood of talent and capital has taken some areas of special situation investing from obscurity to popularity, reducing prospective investment returns.
  3. The more obscure a market niche, the higher the likelihood that diligent investors will generate market-beating returns.
  4. In markets that exhibit informational inefficiency, rewards may accrue to those who make the effort to obtain timely, accurate, and relevant information.
  5. Analytical inefficiencies may plan an even greater role in driving outperformance in special situations.
  6. Investing rules, as distinct from laws, need to be broken occasionally in the pursuit of investment excellence.
  7. Some insights can be gained only if we launch the process of inquiry at the relevant point in time.
  8. Special situations are one of the few investment areas in which it makes sense to pay at least as much attention to the time component of annualized return as to the absolute return expected in a particular situation.
  9. Special situations crystalize the meaning of value.
  10. In the absence of identifiable drivers of inefficiency, the probability may be higher than our appraisal of value contains an oversight or flaw. If we can identify a non-fundamental factor that explains the low valuation, we gain confidence in an estimate of value that differs from the market price.

Chapter 9: Equity Stubs – Investing (or Speculating?) In Leveraged Companies

Common traits of top-performing investors:

  1. They focus on process and not outcomes.
  2. They always seek to have the odds in their favor.
  3. They understand the role of time. You can do the right thing for some time and it won’t show up in results.

It may make sense to start with a de minimis capital allocation or even a “no money” practice portfolio.

The single biggest error in investing is usually overconfidence. Investing is hard, with elements of skill, hard work, and luck involved. An investor who attributes every success to skill is susceptible to overreaching.

Why equity stubs occasionally generate eye-popping returns:

Fear is raw and debilitating, fear compels many investors to avoid specific investments at any price, effectively causing the pricing mechanism of markets to break down.

Some signs of distress that may provide promising equity stub opportunities:

  • Companies with a debt to equity ratio of more than 2 or 3
  • Companies with net debt to market-value of more than 2 or 3
  • Companies with high debt to EBITDA ratio
  • Companies with low interest-coverage
  • Companies that have experienced a large stock price decline

Asking the right questions about equity stubs:

  • How vested is management in the common stock?
  • Are the business fundamentals improving or getting worse?
  • What is the nature of the leverage?

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 9

  1. Passive returns to investing in leveraged equities reveal little about the merits of such an approach. However, the all but certain wide dispersion of returns is crucial.
  2. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of judgment in this area.
  3. We need to be careful not to overreach when our judgment turns out to have been correct.
  4. Due to the lopsided payoff in leveraged equities, the probability of winning on any one investment may be well under 50%.
  5. It helps to commit our investment theses to paper and then test and refine them over time.
  6. The tendency of investors to think about the likely outcome, rather than the range of possible outcomes, represents a key stumbling block to success in leveraged equities.
  7. If we wish to invest in treacherous but potentially rewarding equity stubs, one of the key considerations is who owns the debt on a company’s books.
  8. We distinguish between two types of equity stubs for screening purposes. First, we look for companies that have been designed as equity stubs, namely private-equity type investments available in the public market. Second, we target companies that have become equity stubs due to some kind of stumble.
  9. Our experience suggests that industry-wide selloffs represent better hunting grounds for potential opportunities than do company-specific crises. A single company may stumble in a way that makes recovery of value impossible, but entire industries disappear rarely.
  10. The market sometimes ignores the non-recourse nature of a company’s debt, perceiving the equity as riskier than it actually is. This creates an opportunity for research-oriented investors.

Chapter 10: International Value Investments – Searching for Value Beyond Home Country Borders

The Financial Times has a free screening tool that you can use to screen international and all types of stocks.

Asking the right questions about international equities:

  • How global is the business? (question for Europe)
  • What is the right concentration? (question for India)
  • What is in an ROE? (question for Japan) Companies in Japan hold a lot of equity which skews the ROE numbers lower

Top Ten Takeaways from Chapter 10

  1. Investors seem to have adopted a more realistic view of international investments, shaped by a surge of information, lower transaction costs, the bursting of several bubbles, emergence from several crises, and a realization that economies and markets are more interconnected than ever.
  2. In the interviews we conducted with leading investment managers around the globe, most of them expressed the view that the commonalities of international markets outweigh the differences.
  3. Numerous studies confirm that adding international equities to a portfolio improves the risk-reward profile, either by boosting expected returns for a given level of volatility or by lowering the volatility for a given level of return.
  4. Many investors appear to make the mistake of expecting foreign markets to mirror their domestic markets in every material way. This may be particularly true in the area of corporate governance.
  5. We avoid much trouble in international investing when we accept that some levers, such as corporate governance, are harder to pull than others.
  6. When we go global in the search for investments, we give ourselves a free option to pay a lower price than might be possible in our home market.
  7. Buffett’s concept of a “circle of competence,” while typically used in the context of different industries, may also have applicability to different countries. Due to the many unifying features of global equity investing, we may falsely assume that our competence extends to investing in all geographies.
  8. One of the biggest drivers of disappointment for investors who venture globally might be an unrealistic view of the promise of emerging markets.
  9. The issue of challenging demographic trends confirms the importance of calibrating fundamentals versus expectations.
  10. Excluding a country from consideration, without regard for valuation, may seem like an irrational decision for investors who subscribe to the view that there is a price for everything.

My Action Steps After Reading

  • Created an investing diary to record my investments and the thinking behind them.

Related Book Summaries

Hope you enjoyed this and got value from my notes.
This is the 29th book read in my 2020 reading list.
Here is a list of my book summaries.

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